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T H E C Z E C H O S L O V A K C O M M U N I S T COUP IN T H E 
S I N O - S O V I E T D I S P U T E * 
By Peter A. Tom a 
Historians symbolically refer to our contemporary period as an avalanche 
of unsurpassable social and political upheavals. T o them it represents a ge-
nerál historical process of modernization in which science and technology 
play the strategie role and demoeraey and Communism the tactical part. 
Both Systems are presently competing to control the minds of men caught 
in the web of this process. The outcome of this competition, it would seem, 
hinges on many factors and variables inherent in the problems of moderni-
zation. 
One such factor — a dominant one — is the method by which moderni-
zation takes place. In Communist terminology modernization is corieeived 
as an economic process employing the political means of socialist revolution 
whose funetion it is to bring about the birth of the new society, meaning 
Communism. Hence socialist revolution constitutes a significant part of 
what might be called Communist ideology of modernization. From Marx to 
Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung the Communist theory of revolution had 
played a key role in the appeal to the minds of men interested in economic 
and social modernization. Today this appeal is not only intensified but also 
diversified1. On the one hand, the Russian Communists are emphasizing 
the utility of peaceful socialist revolutions by referring to the February 
(1948) coup in Czechoslovakia as a case in point2; on the other hand, the 
Chinese are denying the usefulness of peaceful socialist revolution and insist 
that there is no historical precedent for a peaceful transition from capital-
ism to socialism. 
T h e aim of this paper is threefold: First, to type all socialist revolutions 
from 1917 to 1962; second, to reexamine the methods by which the Commu-
nist monopoly of power was effected in Czechoslovakia; and third, to eva-
luate the impact of the February coup on the Communist revolutionary 
thinking today. 
* This article represents a portion of the author's study in Czechoslovakia: Past and 
Present. Paris 1965. 
1
 See „The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism." Editorial article 
— comment on the „Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (VIII)" — simultaneously published in central Chinese 
Communist party daily, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] and monthly Hung Ch'i 
[Red Flagj, March 31, 1964. (Hereafter cited as JMJP-HC Joint editorial.) 
2
 K a r , George: The Socialist Revolution — Peaceful and Non-Peaceful. World 
Communist Review V/5 (1962) 33. 
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Basic types of socialist revolutions 
Socialist [actually meaning Communist] revolution is used here to denote 
the Communist bid for the monopoly of power in a non-Communist State. 
Operationally, then, socialist revolution prevails when the non-Communist 
state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a 
Communist monopoly of power is established3. Just how Communist power 
is indeed effected becomes a matter of form of struggle. It can be either 
peaceful (carried out without employing violence) or non-peaceful (accom-
plished by violent means). The forms of peaceful revolutionary struggle are: 
Coup ďetat (when the transfer of the habit of obedience from the old 
to the new government is virtually automatic), plebiscite and electoral pro­
cess. The forms of non-peaceful revolutionary struggle are: Guerrilla or 
civil war, armed uprising and military Intervention. 
Since the power monopoly of the State depends largely on the habit of 
obedience of the governed (rather than their consent), socialist revolution 
usually begins with the lessening of the habit of obedience to the old go­
vernment and ends, if successful, with the effection of the transfer of power 
to the new government affiliated with the Communist systém. Affiliation 
of the new government with the Communist systém must not necessarily 
occur at the time of the transfer of power (as was the case in Cuba), how-
ever, affiliation with the Communist systém is a prerequisite to socialist 
revolution. If the transfer of power to the government affiliated with the 
Communist systém fails to take place, then the revolution is unsuccessful. 
There have been thirty-eight socialist revolutions in the world since 
1917. Fourteen were successful4 and twenty-four were unsuccessful5. Among 
3
 For a detailed description of this operational definition, see A m a n n , Peter: Re­
volution: A Redefinition. Political Science Quarterly 77/1 (1962) 36—53. 
4
 In Russia in October, 1917; in North Vietnam on September 2, 1945; in North 
Korea on September 6, 1945; in Outer Mongolia on October 20, 1945; in Yu-
goslavia on November 29, 1945; in Albania on January 10, 1946; in Bulgaria on 
September 9, 1946; in Poland on January 19, 1947; in Hungary in May, 1947; 
in Romania in November, 1947; in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1948; in China 
on October 1, 1949; in East Germany on October 7, 1949; and in Cuba on 
April 16, 1961. The dates of these revolutions are approximations rather than 
absolutes. For example, in Cuba, April 16, 1961, had been selected as a symbolic 
date making Fidel Castro's announcement of Cuba's affiliation with the Communist 
System. „He repeated it more fully and formally on May 1, 1961, but the former 
date had gained recognition as the official inauguration of the new era." D r a ­
p e r , Theodore: Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities. New York 1962, p. 115. 
Therefore the dates in this study are to be considered as symbolic expressions 
enabling us to build a construct for quantitative analysis. Furthermore, there is no 
generál agreement on dates concerning, for instance, military intervention in 
Eastern Europe after 1944, in either Communist or non-Communist literatuře. 
5
 In Russia-Petrograd from July 16 to 18, 1917; in Finland from January 27 to 
April 12, 1918; in Germany-Berlin from January 5 to 12, 1919; in Hungary from 
March 21 to August 1, 1919; in Bavaria from April 13 to May 1, 1919; in Austria 
on June 15, 1919; in Germany-Mansfeld in March, 1921; in Germany-Hamburg 
24« 
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the fourteen successful socialist revolutions eleven had been accomplished 
non-peacefully (in Russia, North Vietnam, China, Korea, Yugoslavia, Alba-
nia, Bulgaria (1946), Poland, Hungary (1947), Romania and East Germany) 
and three peacefully (in Czechoslovakia, Outer Mongolia and Cuba). Of 
the twenty-four unsuccessful socialist revolutions three were peaceful 
attempts (in Hungary, India-Kerala and San Marino) and twenty-one non-
peaceful attempts (in Russia-Petrograd, Finland, Germany (1919), Bavaria, 
Austria (1919), Germany (1923), Bulgaria (1923), Estonia, Indonesia (1926), 
China: Shanghai, Wu-han and Canton, Austria (1934), Spain (1934), Greece 
(1936), Spain (1937), Greece (1944—45), Burma, Malaya and Indonesia 
(1948). 
Table I. 
Four basic types of socialist revolutions, 1917—1962 
peaceful non-peaceful 
successful 
unsuccessful 
3 
(8 o/o) 
11 
(29 o/o) 
3 
(8%) 
21 
(55 o/«) 
14 
(37 o/«) 
24 
(63 o/0) 
6 
(16%) 
32 
(84 o/o) 
38 
(100%) 
Of the eleven successful socialist revolutions that were accomplished non-
peacefully, six were usurpations imposed by the agents of the occupying 
Soviet army (in North Korea, Bulgaria (1946), Poland, Hungary (1947), 
Romania and East Germany); and five were guerrilla or civil wars (in 
on October 5, 1923; in Bulgaria on September 21, 1923; in Estonia on December 1, 
1924; in Indonesia-Java and Sumatra in November, 1926; in China: Shanghai in 
March, 1927; Wu-han from June to July, 1927; and Canton from December 11 
to 14, 1927; in Austria-Linz and Vienna from February 12 to 16, 1934; in Spain-
Asturias in October, 1934; in Greece from March to May, 1936; in Spain-Catalonia 
in May, 1937; in Greece from December 1, 1944, to January 11, 1945; in Burma 
from March, 1948, to present; in Malaya from July 7, 1948, to June 30, 1960; 
in Indonesia-Madiun in September, 1948; in India-Kerala from April, 1957, to 
July 31, 1959; and in San Marino from August 14, 1945, to September 19, 1957. 
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Russia, China, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Albania). The form of 
struggle for the three remaining successful socialist revolutions — accom­
plished peacefully — two were coups ďetat (in Czechoslovakia and 
Cuba) and one was a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia. Of the twenty-one non-
peaceful socialist revolutions that failed, sixteen were armed uprisings (in 
Russia-Petrograd, Germany (1919), Germany (1921), Germany (1923), Bul­
garia (1923), Estonia, Indonesia (1926), China: Shanghai, Wu-han and 
Canton, Austria (1934), Spain (1934), Greece (1936), Spain (1937) and In­
donesia (1948)) and five guerrilla or civil wars (in Finland, Bavaria, Greece 
(1944—45), Malaya and Burma). The form of struggle for peaceful socialist 
revolutions that failed was one coup ďetat in Hungary in 1919 and two 
by electoral process in India-Kerala and San Marino. 
Table II. 
Forms of struggle of four basic types of socialist revolutions, 1917—1962 
peaceful non-peaceful 
Electoral Military Guerrilla Armed 
Coup ďetat Plebiscite Process Interven. Civil War Uprising 
14 
(36.9 o/o) 
24 
(63.1 o/0) 
3 1 2 6 10 16 38 
(7.9 o/o) (2.6 o/o) (5.3 o/o) (15.8%) (26.4%) (42<>/0) (100%) 
In many cases the form of struggle was not a single-factor affair. Over-
lappings of one form of struggle with another were frequent occurences in 
the history of socialist revolutions. For example, in North Korea and Po­
land military Intervention and in Czechoslovakia and Cuba the coups ďetat 
were all preceded by guerrilla wars which if not controlled were at least 
infiltrated by the Communist takeover at an opportune time. 
Perhaps a more important factor affecting the outcome of socialist revo­
lutions was Communist military conquest and Cooperation. In fact, Commu­
nist expansion was more effective through military conquest and occupa-
tion than through any other form of struggle6. Thus, while revolutionary 
6
 Since October, 1917, the following territories were acquired by the Communists 
through military conquest and occupation: Estonia (from October, 1917, to Ja­
nuary, 1918), the Ukraine (from December 27, 1917, continuously), Belorussia 
(from December 30, 1917, continuously), Turkestan (from January 3, 1918, con­
tinuously), North Caucasus (from Aprii, 1918, continuously), Latvia (from Decem­
ber, 1918, to April, 1919), Lithuania (from January to May, 1919), Slovakia (from 
successful 
unsuccessful 
2 1 0 
(5.3 o/o) (2.6 o/o) 
6 5 0 
(15.8 o/0) (13.2o/o) 
1 0 2 
(2.6 o/0) (5.3 o/0) 
0 5 16 
(13.2 o/0) (42 o/0) 
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attempts of all types and forms of struggle account for a total of thirty-
eight incidents, military conquest and occupation, during the samé period 
of time involved, amount to forty-two cases7. 
From 1917 to 1920 (the period of „international solidarity with the 
Soviet people"), there were seven revolutionary attempts of various types 
(military Intervention excluded) trying to establish the dictatorship of the 
Proletariat, but only one succeeded, that in Russia. During the world de-
pression years, 1929—1933, when strikes, unemployment and demonstrations 
were higher than during any other period of Communist history, and when 
Communists all over the world were supposed to be guided by the program 
of the VI. Congress of the Comintern (issued on September 1, 1928) cailing 
for the creation of a „World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" through 
the violent overthrow of bourgeois power and the Substitution in its place 
of proletarian power, there were no revolutionary attempts anywhere and 
in many countries the membership in Communist parties declined rather 
than forged ahead8. After the Second World War, during the 1945—1950 
June 16 to July 5, 1919), Azerbaidjan (from April, 1920, continuously), Armenia 
(from November 29, 1920, continuously), Poland-Bialystok (from July 31, 1920, 
to March 18, 1921), Georgia (from February, 1920, continuously), Mongolia 
(from March 13, 1920, to June 11, 1921), Poland: Polosk-Kamenetz-Podolsk line 
(from September 17, 1939, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II) , 
Finland-Karelia (from November 30, 1939, to June 22, 1941, and after World 
War II continuously), Romania-Bessarabia and Bukovina (from June 28, 1940, 
to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II), Lithuania (from August 3, 
1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II) , Latvia (from 
August 5, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II), Estonia 
(from August 6, 1940, to June 22, 1941, and continuously after World War II), 
Iran-Azerbaidjan and Kurdistan (from October 6, 1941, to May 6, 1946), Romania 
(from August, 1944, to May 13, 1955), Czechoslovakia (from October, 1944, to 
December, 1945), Subcarpathian Ruthenia (from February, 1945, continuously), 
Bulgaria (from September, 1944, to September 15, 1947), Tannu-Tuva (from 
October 11, 1944, continuously), Poland (from July, 1944, to May 13, 1955), Hun-
gary (from September, 1944, to May 13, 1955), East Germany (from April, 1945, 
to May 13, 1955), Austria (from April, 1945, to May 15, 1955), Northern Man-
churia (from August 9, 1945, to February 15, 1946), North Korea (from August 14, 
1945, to January 1, 1949), Southern Sakhalin, Kurile Islands and Port Arthur 
(from August 15, 1945, continuously), South Korea (from June 25, 1950, to Sep-
tember 10, 1950), Laos (from June, 1952, to March, 1953), Cambodia (from March 
to July, 1954), and Tibet (from March, 1959, continuously). (The reason for 
mentioning Estonia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Turkestan, North Caucasus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Azerbaidjan, Armenia, and Georgia separately from Russia during the 
Bolshevik Revolution is mostly because these territories had declared national 
independence, without gaining recognition from any governments, prior to the 
time of conquest and occupation by the Soviet Red Army, in most cases made up 
of their own nationals. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not establishcd 
until December 22, 1922.) 
7
 See Appendix I. 
8
 On the basis of empirical investigation, one tentative answer to the question of 
why between 1929—1933 there were no socialist revolutionary attempts is this: 
The Communists must have learned from their past mistakes that unless they 
have strong party support from the working class and the discontented masses — 
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period, there were sixteen revolutionary attempts of various types (military 
Intervention included)9, however, this time the ratio was almost reversed: 
There were twelve successful and only four unsuccessful socialist revolu­
tions. Among the successful socialist revolutions the February (1948) coup 
in Czechoslovakia was probably of greater significance than any other so­
cialist revolution since World War II. It marked the beginning of a new 
revolutionary era in the history of socialist revolutions. 
The Czechoslovak example 
The socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia, as the Czechoslovak Commu­
nist historians view it today, began on May 27, 1946, one day after the 
first post-war parliamentary elections, and ended on June 27, 1948, the 
day when the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party was absorbed into the 
Communist party of Czechoslovakia10. From April, 1945, (when the basic 
principles to which the post-war Czechoslovak government professed alle-
giance were spelled out in a document known as the Kosice Programme) 
until May 27, 1946, the Communists in Czechoslovakia were engaged in a 
so-called national and democratic revolution. The primary task for the 
Communists in this period was to build Communist strength in the nation. 
In practice this meant the Organization of a mass Communist party con­
trolled by a hard-core Communist elitě11; the assumption of power by the 
Communist-controlled national committees12; the formation of a new peo-
rendering them an even chance in the projected struggle — it is. better to abstain 
and go into more intensive preparation for the revolution than to také an uneven 
chance and risk defeat, which could be a great setback for world Communism as 
evidenced from the experience in Finland, Germany, Bulgaria, etc. — countries 
where the Communist parties, after the abortive attempts, were driven underground. 
9
 China, Indochina, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Korea, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Outer Mongolia, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia. 
1 0
 See V e s e l ý , Jindřich: Prag Februar 1948. Berlin 1959, pp. 25 and 345. 
1 1
 While the Social Democrats, the Populists, the National Socialists and the Slovák 
Democrats only began to establish and build their organizations, the Communists 
were already strengthening their mass party . . . The Communist strength in 
membership was always stronger than that of all the other parties combined. See 
V e s e l ý 14 and K o z á k , Jan: T h e New Role of National Legislative Bodies in 
the Communist Conspiracy. Washington 1962, p. 31. Cf. also K o z á k , J a n : 
Znacheniye natsional'noy i demokraticheskoy revolyutsii v Chekhoslovakii dlya 
bor'by rabochego klassa za sotsializm [The Significance of the National and De­
mocratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia in the Struggle of the Working Class for 
Socialism]. Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 4 (July 1962). 
1 2
 „In the first months after liberation, the national committees wielded extraordinary 
powers, for no other authority existed and they expressed the first eleetion of 
self-government after German oppression. In time they organized in communes, 
districts, and provinces, and were granted broad powers of administration, both 
in local affairs and as arms of the authority of the government." See D i a m o n d , 
William: Czechoslowakia Between East and West. London 1947, p. 47. Although 
elections to the national committees were not held until May 16, 1954, shortly 
after the generál eleetion in 1946, the Communists — because of the support from 
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ple's security systém and army1 3; the prohibition of the revival of the poli­
tical parties which had represented the reactionary interests in pre-war 
Czechoslovakia — (in this group was also included the largest pre-war 
political party, the Agrarian party)14; a systematic purge of the political, 
economic and cultural life of the country15; the settlement of the relations 
the Soviet army until May, 1945, and because of the extraordinary strength of 
their own party since May, 1945 — held 55 per cent of the chairmanships of 
local national committees, 80 per cent of district national committees, and 100 per 
cent of provincial national committees. In 37.5 per cent of all local national 
committees the Communists maintained an absolute majority. See Vratislav B u s e k 
and Nicolas S p u l b e r , eds., Czechoslovakia. New York 1957, p. 66. — Václav 
K r á l , ed., Vznik a vývoj lidové demokratického Československa [The Origin 
and Development of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia]. Československá akademie 
věd (1961) 225 and 234. — V e s e l ý 25. Thus, the Statement that „in 1944—45, 
under the leadership of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, national com­
mittees became the main mass-media of our national democratic revolution", was 
both candid and accurate. See K r á l 347 and Komunistická strana Československa; 
Ústřední výbor, Národní výbory [National Committees]. Prague 1946. 
1 3
 After the war the former police force was replaced by the so-called National 
Security Corps (SNB). The majority of the new security officers were former 
workers and peasants, some were veterans of the 1944—45 partisan movement, 
and a large number of the new policemen belonged to the Communist party. T h e 
Ministry of Interior, which was in charge of the new security Organization, was 
headed by a Communist whose successful communization of the SNB became one 
of the major issues during the February, 1948, crisis. * 
T h e new Czechoslovak army was built on the Soviet model with Soviet equipment; 
it resembled the Soviet army in almost every aspect of its Organization with the 
exception that there were no party organizations in the Czechoslovak army units. 
„In the army [we] introduced only a systém of party confidants appointed from 
the top and reaching down to the Company level . . . this systém of confidants 
relied on the support of the enlightenment officers and higher up it was running 
parallel with the enlightenment apparatus. Thus the organs of enlightenment be­
came the nucleonic forms of the party organs and the party apparatus in the 
army . . . Developments in the army after 1945 were forged ahead by means of 
a struggle between the embryos of the new and the remnants of the old ele-
ments . . . A significant contribution was made by some army representatives, 
headed by the then Minister of National Defense, General L. Svoboda, whom the 
party won to its side and who successfully carried out the military part of the 
government program." See K r á l 251—252. 
" This agreement enabled the Communists in Slovakia to divide party power on 
an equal basis with the Slovák Democrats in špite of the fact that numerically 
speaking they were actually in a minority. Until the spring of 1946 there were 
only two political parties — the Slovák Communist party and the Slovák Demo­
cratic party — in existence in Slovakia; and because of the „parity systém" (every 
party being represented by the equal number of officials in the local government), 
the Communists were able to maintain a lead over their rivals in both the Czech 
lands (where they had a numerical advantage) and in Slovakia (where they had 
only one competitor). 
1 5
 „By October, 1946, twenty thousand persons had been arraigned before the People's 
Courts, one third of them Czechs; 362 of them (of whom 205 were Germans) were 
executed, 426 sentenced to life imprisonment; 13,548 received sentences amounting 
to over 100,000 years; 3,771 were acquitted." See R. R. B e t t s , ed., Central and 
South East Europe, 1945—1948. London 1950, p. 176. 
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between the Czech and Slovák nations on the principle of equality; the ex-
pulsion of the German minority, and other measures enabling the Commu-
nists to apply the „pincer" tactic against their enemies. 
According to this technique, pressure is first created „from below" (the 
masses) through agitation, then it is combined with pressure „from above" 
(a Communist-dominated national and local government16 and parliament) 
through legislative initiative so that the Opposition is constantly on the 
defense — moving in a Communist-activated area, which can be described 
as the jaws of a pincer. The aim of this scheme is to force the rivals to 
yield to exerted pressures by the National Front (representing the political 
unity) and by the workers and peasants (representing the national unity of 
the State) so that the adversaries can eventually be controlled and maneu-
vered into a desirable position for the final kill17. In Czechoslovakia this 
final act was accomplished in the middle of February, 1948. Until then the 
Communists were skillfully employing the „pincer" technique in a complex 
process of power struggle. 
During the first stage — the national-democratic revolution — the Com-
munists kept alive the struggle against former Nazis and collaborators, 
against black marketeers and opportunists, against those hostile to the 
Kosice Programme and against opponents of the Czechoslovak-Soviet 
alliance. At the same time, within bounds, the Communists encouraged pri-
vate capitalist enterprise and through their auxiliary organizations and 
left-wing Social Democrats rallied support for greater civil, political and 
economic rights in order to bring class antagonism into closer ränge. How-
ever, class struggle on such issues as „reactionary domestic forces", slow 
legislative work, „Sabotage" by! „the millionnaires", the Marshall Plan, 
espionage for a „reactionary power" and the so-called „plot to overthrow 
the government" did not take place until several months after the parlia-
mentary elections of 194618. The Communists in Czechoslovakia had decided 
Ever since the first Provisional Government was formed in 1945, the Communists, 
through their f ellow-travelers such as Z. Fierlinger, B. Lausmann and L. Svoboda, 
maintained a simple majority until February, 1948. 
As to the question why did -the representatives of the non-Communist parties in 
April, 1945, at Kosice agree to such a program is accurately answered by a Com-
munist historian in this passage: „What could they have done? Their political 
and organizational positions were very weak yet, whereas the revolutionary elan 
of the nation was so strong and expressed with such vigor and determination 
that the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Government and the National 
Front had no other alternative but to consent to certain measures which in reality 
meant the undermining of the very foundations on which the capitalist order was 
built." V e s e l ý 17. Cf. also T á b o r s k y , Edward: Benes and Stalin — Moscow 
1943 and 1945. Journal of Central European Affairs 13/2 (1953) 154—181. 
As a result of the May, 1946, elections, the Communists emerged as the strongest 
post-war party in Czechoslovakia with 38.1 per cent of the votes cast in their 
behalf. Second was the National Socialist party with 18.5 per cent; third, the 
People's party with 15.7 per cent; fourth, the Slovák Democratic party with 
14.1 per cent; fifth, the Social Democratic party with 12.1 per cent; sixth, the 
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first to legitimize their power through the electoral process and then to 
test it in a class war against the bourgeoisie involving „the revolutionary 
use of parliament". 
The main ingredients of the Communist strength during the socialist re­
volution, which in February, 1948, tipped the scales in Communist favor, 
were: (1) the ability to exploit the labor movement; (2) the monopoly over 
agricultural policy; and (3) the skill to transform the Social Democratic 
party into a front Organization serving Communist interests. 
Ever since the end of the war, the Communist-organized Revolutionary 
Trade Unions Movement (ROH) proclaimed itself the one and only trade 
union Organization in Bohemia and Moravia. A similar Organization, under 
identical circumstances, was established in Slovakia and on February 28, 
1946, the two organizations merged into a single body called the United 
Revolutionary Trade Unions Movement of Czechoslovakia19. In spite of 
the population loss of some 2.5 million since 1939, the strength of the new 
trade union movement in February, 1948, stood at its pre-war peak of 
2 250 000 — eighty-six per cent Czech and fourteen per cent Slovák mem-
bers20. This membership made it the largest single Organization in the 
country. By law, ROH was permitted to participate and to make suggestions 
in all legislative and executive matters affecting the workers; it had the 
right to representation on all public bodies not popularly elected; and it 
enjoyed a decisive position in management. Since ROH hat a hierarchically 
centralized structure, decision making was vested in a twenty-member 
Board of Trustees of the Central Council of Trade Unions (URO) — both 
Slovák Freedom party with less than one per cent; and seventh, the Slovák Labor 
party with less than one per cent. It is noteworthy that the Marxist parties (the 
two Communist parties, the Social Democratic party and the Slovák Labor party) 
secured 51 per cent of the votes cast. 516,428 out of a total electorate of 
7,583,784 evaded the law of compulsory voting, spoiled their ballot papers, sent 
them in blank, or just declared their indifference to the eleetion. For additional 
information on the elections, See D i a m o n d 239. 
1 9
 After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1939, the once scattered and 
diffused labor movement (in 1930's the number of unions, organized by crafts, 
reached about 700, of which 485 were organized into nation-wide centrals, while 
the remainder were independent) had been reorgänized and unified (both in the 
so-called Protectorate and the Slovák State) into two unions, one for private 
employees and one for civil servants. They became the nuclei for the passive 
Communist underground movement until the twilight of Nazism in Czechoslovakia. 
When the Russian Red Army was entering Czechoslovakia, the members of the 
labor movement began to organize underground national committees, revolutionary 
guards in factories, and after the liberation they assumed police duties in many 
cities and towns. Thus, it is safe to assume that what Anton Zápotocký, leader 
of the Red Unions in pre-war Czechoslovakia, could not aecomplish from 1927 
to 1938, the Nazis did during their occupation of Czechoslovakia. See Z á p o ­
t o c k ý , A.: Boj o jednotu odborů [The Struggle for the Unification of Trade 
Unions]. Prague 1949. 
2 0
 T h e number of wage and salary earners in Czechoslovakia for that period was 
3,500,000. See State Statistical Office: Statistická příručka republiky Česko­
slovenské. Prague 1948, p. 41. 
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dominated by the Communist party. Thus, whenever the Communist strate-
gists needed to exert pressure on their rivals from below, they could call 
on the trade unions; the leadership of the labor movement would see to it 
that labor support for Communist programs was available in noticeable 
measure. The trade unions in post-war Czechoslovakia were controlled by 
Communists and not by Social Democratic bureaucrats. 
ROH, as a class and socialist Organization, Consolidated the unity of the 
workers' class; it enhanced its revolutionary strength and weight and, un-
der the leadership of the Communist party, it ušed its strength most effec-
tively for the fortification of the people's democratic power and for the ad-
vancement of the socialist revolution21. 
What URO was able to achieve for the Communists during the national-
democratic revolution in the labor movement, the „Peasants' Commissions" 
were able to master in the agricultural drive during the socialist revolution.. 
As organs of the landless, small and medium farmers (applicants for land), 
these commissions — founded and controlled by Communists — represented 
the strongest organized farm group demanding a new land reform in Cze-
choslovakia22. Thei r pressure on the non-Communist parties in the Czecho-
slovak Parliament helped to trigger off a class struggle with the bourgeoisie 
which in February, 1948, culminated in Communist seizure of power. 
The Communist scheme for the advancement of the socialist revolution 
in agriculture entailed the following steps. First, the members of the Pea-
sants' Commissions discussed a draft proposal for land reform, submitted 
to them by the Communist-controlled Ministry of Agriculture; then, after 
voting upon it, they drew up petitions and passed resolutions in favor of 
the draft bili which was forwarded by thousands to Parliament where the 
Communists openly agitated and debated for passage of the program. M. P. 's 
who were opposed to the measure were exposed as friends of „kulaks" and 
enemies of the people. Next, the Ministry of Agriculture announced even 
more drastic land reform proposals — thus exerting more pressure „from 
above", which in turn created greater intensity of the class struggle. In 
order to bring the complex process to a climax, delegations from the Pea-
sants' Commissions — joined by representatives of other Communist-inspi-
red organizations — stormed the Parliament building and shouted slogans 
21
 K o z á k 25. 
22
 In accordance with the Kosice Programme, the first large transfer of land was 
carried out in 1945 and early 1946 when 2,946,395 hectares of land belonging 
to „big holders, enemies and traitors" were confiscated and allotted, on the basis 
of decrees, to 305,148 families of farm workers, tenants and small-holders. Large 
landowners — holding more than 50 hectares of land — still occupied 
approximately one-fifth of the land, which the Communists interpreted as 
dangerous bourgeois strength in the countryside. Therefore, in the fall of 1946, 
the Communist-headed Ministry of Agriculture announced a proposal for a drastic 
„reform" program that would confiscate land from the so-called „rest-estate 
holders" and „speculators", i. e., land-owners with over 150 hectares of arable 
or 250 hectares of agricultural land. Sec K o z á k 28—29. 
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demanding immediate implementation of the proposal — thus exerting more 
pressure „from below." Finally, the pressure from „above" and from „be-
low" closed like the claws of a pair of pincers and the badly shaken Oppo­
sition, suffering from political pressure, gave way to the passage of the 
land reform laws which were interpreted by Communists and non-Commu-
nists alike as one more Communist victory. When the last step of this 
scheme was actually taken, according to the Communist historian Jan Ko­
zák, on July 11, 1947, the consequences of it were: „the liquidation of more 
of the economic positions of the bourgeoisie in the village, a big political 
defeat of the bourgeoisie (its increasing isolation), a considerable streng-
thening and broadening of the bond between the workers' class and the 
working peasantry 2 3 ." 
Since i t was imperative for the Communists in Czechoslovakia during 
the socialist revolution always to be on the offensive24, pressures against 
the Opposition, similar to those mentioned above, continued in füll dosage 
until February 20, 1948. Twelve non-Communist party leaders in the twen-
ty-six-member Gottwald government — exhausted and unable to cope with 
such pressures any longer — resigned and thus prompted a Communist-
engendered government crisis. While the disorganized opponents were still 
in shock, suffering from Communist „fair play", the proponents were dis-
playing „mass support" for Premier Gottwald by organizing workers ' and 
peasants' demonstrations and by parading armed militia-men in the town 
Squares. Meanwhile, pressure had been mounted against a feeble old man, 
the President of the Republic, to accept the resignations of the twelve mi-
nisters and to appoint new ones (Communists and fellow-travelers) — hand 
picked long before the February crisis by the Presidium of the Communist 
party. With the formation of a new government, suddenly the Opposition 
disintegrated, opportunists from the opposite side of the aisles found new 
allies, and the Communist party seemed to be steadily moving towards the 
final stage of the socialist revolution. By February 25, 1948, the transfer 
from the old to the new government through the habit of obedience was 
for all practical purposes completed. T h e replacement of the capitalist with 
the Communist state's monopoly of power, however, had not become final 
until June 27, 1948. 
T h e period between the February coup and the June Gleichschaltung was 
effectively ušed by the Communists to win to their side the „orphans" of 
capitalism and to consolidate the power of the dictatorship of the Proleta­
riat in the new people's democratic statě. For these ends the Communists 
employed the following means: They initiated a third land reform which, 
as an overture to collectivization announced in November, 1949, limited pri­
vate ownership of the land to fifty hectares in size 2 5; permitted a new in-
2 3
 K o z á k 31. 
24
 K r á l 176. 
2 5
 For additional information on this, see B u s e k 250 II. 
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flux of membres into the Communist party26; introduced a new Constitution 
which formalized the transmission belts of the new regime27; gradually re-
moved all „enemies of the people" from responsible positions in the statě; 
and, on May 28, held a new eleetion, this time with a single list of candi-
dates receiving 89.3 per cent of the votes east (the rest were blank ballots 
indicating Opposition), which legitimized the power they acquired in Fe­
bruary, 1948. Hereafter the road was open for the Communists to travel 
with füll speed towards the complete establishment of Communist monopoly 
of power in the statě. It took them only one month to reach their destina-
tion. 
On June 7, Edward Beneš formally resigned his post as President of the 
Czechoslovak statě and on June 27 the Communist party rejoiced over the 
incorporation of the expurgated rump of the Social Democratic party. Ac-
cording to Klement Gottwald, President Beneš' successor, June 27 was as 
outstanding in the history of the Czechoslovak working class as May, 1945, 
and February, 194828. It symbolized the finale of a performance given by 
the left-wing members of the Social Democratic party under the „baton" 
of their leader, Zdenek Fierlinger. First as Premier and later as Vice-Pre-
mier, Fierlinger was instrumental in Converting the National Front into a 
„symphony orchestra" monopolized by Communist patrons. 
With Social Democratic support in both the government and the legisla-
ture, the Communists were able to put through all their major proposals by 
simple majority. Since in the multipolar systém of the national-front go­
vernment the balance lay with the Social Democrats, the non-Communists, 
eager to win Social Democratic support, were also prepared to yield to So­
cial Democratic demands which, in effect, represented Communist proposals 
advertently assigned for implementation to their front Organization. 
The post-war Social Democratic party, which was built vertically by the 
surviving left-wing leaders as an integral part of Communist power29, ser-
ved both as a Communist catalyst and a national solidifier in the political 
arena of new Czechoslovakia. Considering the strength of the pre-war Social 
Democratic party, especiaUy in the labor movement30, the reason for organiz-
ing two rather than one Marxist parties, at least in the Czech lands, be-
comes obvious. In order to capture the forty per cent of all union members 
who before the war belonged to Social Democratic unions, and in order to 
For a table on membership changes, see below, p. 383. 
For details, see T á b o r s k y , Edward: Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948—1960. 
Princeton 1961, pp. 165—348. 
Komunistická strana Československa: S jednotnou stranou dělnické třídy k 
vítězství socialismu [With a Unified Party of the Working Class to the Victory 
of Socialism]. Prague 1948, p. 6. 
See Z. F i e r l i n g e r ' s testimony of this in his address to the Merger Convention 
of the two parties on June 27, 1948, in ibid. 31—33. 
For a penetrating analysis of Communist strength in Czechoslovakia and other 
East European countries, see B u r k s, R. V.: The Dynamics of Communism in 
Eastern Europe. Princeton 1961. 
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prevent the right-wing leaders from usurping the potential Social Demo­
cratic power, the left-wing leaders, supported by the Soviet army and Czech 
Communists, built a new Social Democratic party which in reality became a 
branch of the Communist party under a different label. Under left-wing 
management, the Social Democratic party had become an indispensable tool 
of Communist conspiracy. Without Social Democratic support, Communist 
pressure „from above" would have been a fiasco and the peaceful seizure of 
power in February, 1948, unattainable. 
T h e above analysis of the peaceful socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia 
is derived from arguments mostly presented by Communist historians of 
that country. Our next task is to examine the Communist Chinese interpre-
tation of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia in the light of the Sino-
Sovict rift and then to extricate the lessons that follow from the contro-
versy. 
The Peking viewpoint 
Unlike the Communists in Prague, Peking is of the opinion that the Com­
munist monopoly of power in Czechoslovakia was takcn from the bour­
geoisie non-peacefully during World War I I rather than peacefully during 
the period from May, 1946, to June, 1948. T h e Chinese Communists argue 
that in the course of the anti-fascist war the Communist party of Czecho­
slovakia, by employing „guerrilla warfare and armed uprisings against the 
fascists", was able to establish a national coalition government which „was 
in essence a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the 
Proletariat, i.e., a form of the dictatorship of the Proletariat" 3 1 . T h e events 
in February, 1948, according to the Chinese interpretation of the socialist 
revolution in Czechoslovakia, represent „ . . . a counter-revolutionary coup 
ďetat to overthrow the people's government by an armed rebellion. But the 
government led by the Communist party immediately deployed its armed 
forces and organized armed mass demonstrations, thus shattering the bour-
geois plot for a counter-revolutionary come-back. These facts clearly testify 
that the February event was not a ,peacefuT seizure of political power by the 
working class from the bourgeoisie but a suppression of a counter-revolutio­
nary bourgeois coup ďetat by the working class through its own statě appa­
ratus, and mainly through its own armed forces3 2." 
In other words, Peking would like us to believe that the socialist revolu­
tion in Czechoslovakia began in August, 1944, (with the „Communist led" 
Slovák National Uprising) and ended in May, 1945, (with the „Communist 
led" Prague Uprising and the establishment of the Provisional government 
— designated as „a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of 
the Proletariat"). From then on, according to Peking, the administration, 
the armed forces, the police, the courts, legislation, the schools, trade, indu-
3 1
 JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
32
 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX I 
COMMUNIST EXPANSION, 1917—1962 
PLACE 
(In Chronological Order 
MILITARY CONQUEST TYPES OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS 
and OCCUPATION Peaceful Non-Peaceful Successful Unsuccessful Military Interv. Armed Uprising 
FORMS OF REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 
Guerrilla or Civil War Coup d'Etat Plebiscite Elect. Process 
1. Russia (Petrograd) 
2. Russia 
3. Estonia (SRA) 
4. Ukraine (SRA) 
5. Belorussia (SRA) 
6. Turkestan (SRA) 
7. Finland 
8. N. Caucasus (SRA) 
9. Germany (Berlin) 
10. Latvia (SRA) 
11. Lithuania (SRA) 
12. Hungary 
13. Bavaria 
14. Austria 
15. Slovakia (HRA) 
16. Azerbaidjan (SRA) 
17. Armenia (SRA) 
18 Poland (Bialystock — SRA) 
19. Georgia (SRA) 
20. Germany (Mansfeld) 
21. Mongoli'a (SRA) 
22. Germany (Hamburg) 
23. Bulgaria 
24. Estonia 
25. Indonesia (Java) 
26. China (Shanghai) 
27. China (Wu-han) 
28. China (Canton) 
29. China (Prov. Govt.) 
30. Austria (Linz — Vienna) 
31. Spain (Asturias) 
32. Greece 
33. Spain (Catalonia) 
34. Poland (Polosk — Podolsk 
— SA) 
35. Finland (Karelia — SA) 
36. Romania (Bessarabia and 
Bukovina — SA) 
37. Lithuania (SA) 
38. Latvia (SA) 
39. Estonia (SA) 
40. Iran (Azerbaidjan — SA) 
41. Indochina (N. Vietnam) 
42. Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 
43. Albania (LNC) 
44. Greece (PEEA — EAM — 
ELAS) 
45. Bessarabia & Bukovina (SA) 
46. Karelia (SA) 
47. Latvia (SA) 
48. Iran (Azerbaidjan — SA) 
49. Lithuania (SA) 
50. Estonia (SA) 
51. Romania (SA) 
52. Czechoslovakia (SNP — 
PP — SA) 
53. Poland (KRN — AL — 
SA) 
54. Bulgaria (SA) 
55. Hungary (SA) 
56. Tannu — Tuva (SA) 
57. Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
58. Austria (SA) 
59. East Germany (SA) 
60. Northern Manchuria (SA) 
61. North Korea (PEL — SA) 
62. So. Sakhalin, Kurile Is. & 
Port Arthur (SA) 
63. Outer Mongolia 
64. Malaya 
65. Burma 
66. Indonesia (Madiun) 
67. South Korea (KPA) 
68. Laos (NVPA) 
69. Cambodia (NVPA) 
70. India (Kerala) 
71. Tibet (CPA) 
72. San Marino 
73. Cuba (26JM) 
Totais 
x 
X 
X. 1917 — 1.1918 
XII. 27, 1917— 
XII. 30, 1917— 
I. 3, 1918— 
IV. 1918— 
XII. 1918 — IV. 1919 
I.—V. 1919 
VI. 16 — V I I . 5, 1919 
IX. 1920— 
X L 29, 1920 
VII. 31, '20 —III. 18, '21 
IL 1921— 
III. 13 — I V . 11, 1921 
x 
X 
VI. 1944— 
VII. 1944— 
VII. 1944— 
VII. 1944— 
VIII. 1944— 
IX. 1944— 
VIII. '44 — V. 13, *55 
X. '44 — XII. '45 
VII. '44 — V. 13, '55 
IX.'44 — I X . 15, '47 
IX.'44 — V . 13, '55 
X. 11, 1944— 
IL 1945— 
IV. '45 — V. 16. '55 
IV. '45 — V. 13, '55 
VIII. 9,'45 — I I . 15, '46 
VIII. 14, '45 — I. 1, '49 
VIII. 15, 1945— 
VI. 25, '50 — I X . 10, '50 
VI. '52 — III. '53 
III.—VII. 1954 
III. 1959 
x 
X 
XII. 30, '22 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X. 1, 1949 
X 
X 
X 
X 
IX. 17, '39 — VI. 22, '41 
IX. 30, '39 — VI. 22, '41 
VI. 28, '40 — V I . 22, '41 
VIII. 3, '40 — VI. 22, '41 
VIII. 5, '40 — V I . 22, '41 
VIII. 6, '40 — V I . 22, '41 
X. 6, '41 — V. 6, '46 
X IX. 2, '45 
X XI. 29, '45 
X I. 10, '46 
X 
XI. 1947 
II. 25, 1948 
I. 19, 1947 
IX. 9, 1946 
V. 1947 
IV. 16, 1961 
VII. 16—18, 1917 VII. 16—18, 1917 
1.27 — V I . 12, 1918 
I. 5—12, 1919 
III. 21 —VIII. 1, '19 
IV. 13 — V . 1, 1919 
VI. 15, 1919 
III. 1921 
X. 5, 1923 
IX. 21, 1923 
XII. 1, 1924 
XI. 1926 
III. 1927 
VI.—VII. 1927 
XII. 11—14, 1927 
II. 12—16, 1934 
X.1934 
III.—V. 1936 
V. 1937 
I. 5—12, 1919 
VI. 15, 1919 
III. 1921 
X. 5, 1923 
IX. 21, 1923 
XII. 1, 1924 
XI. 1926 
III. 1927 
VI.—VII. 1927 
XII. 11—14, 1927 
IL 12—16, 1934 
X. 1934 
III.—V. 1936 
V. 1937 
X. 1917 — X I I . 1922 
1.27 —IV. 12,1918 
TV. 13 — V . 1, 1919 
III . 21 — V I I I . 1, '19 
XI. 7, '31 — X . 1, '49 
XII. 1, '44 — 1. 11, '45 
III . 1941—VII. 20, '54 
XL 1942 — XI. 29, 1945 
IX. 1942 — 1.10, 1946 
III . 1944 — L H , 1945 
X X. 7, 1949 
X IX. 6, 1945 
X. 20, 1945 
X VII. 7—16, 1948 
X III. 1948— 
X IX.1948 
IV. '57 — V I I . 31, '59 
VIII. 14, '45 — I X . 19, 1957 
IX. 1947 
I. 19, 1947 
IX. 9, 1946 
V. 1947 
V. 30, 1949 
IX. 6, 1945 
VIII. '44 — V. 9, '45 II. 21—25, '48 
IX. '44 — VIII. 14, '45 
VII. 7, '48 —VI . 31, '60 
III . 1948 
X. 20, 1945 
IX.1948 
VII. 26 , '53 — 1 . 1 , ' 5 9 IV. 16, 1961 
IV. '57 — V I I . 31, '59 
VIII. 14, '45 — I X . 19, '57 
42 32 14 24 16 10 
Key: SRA = Soviet Revolutionary Army 
HRA = Hungarian Red Army 
SA = Soviet Army 
AVNOJ = Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia 
LNC = National Liberation Movement 
PEEA = Pan-Popular Committee of National Liberation 
EAM = National Liberation Front 
ELAS = People's Liberation Army 
PP = Prague Uprising 
SNP = Slovák National Uprising 
KRN = National Council of the Homeland 
AL = People's Army 
KPA = Korean People's Army 
NVPA = North Vietnamese People's Army 
CPA = Chinese People's Army 
PEL = People's Emancipation League 
26JM = 26 th of July Movement 
stry, foreign relations and other parts of the statě power monopoly were in 
the hands of Czechoslovak Communists who in February, 1948, continued to 
maintain this power in špite of the „reactionary plot" to overthrow them. 
T o those individuals who lived in Czechoslovakia prior to February, 1948, 
or who participated in the struggle against Nazi occupation, or who were 
members in President Beneš' statě apparatus, the Chinese explanation of the 
socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia is at best a fantasy. Communist po­
wer in Czechoslovakia was weakest (paradoxically, however, Soviet power 
— due to the so-called liberation of Czechoslovakia-was strongest) from 
August, 1944, to May, 1945 — it was gradually stronger in 1946 and 1947 
and strongest in 1948. 
Table III . 
Membership of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia* 
Period Number of Members 
May, 1945 27,000 
August, 1945 712,776 
March, 1946 1,081,544 
November, 1947 1,281,138 
January, 1948 1,539,672 
November, 1948 2,500,000 
* Sources: Rudé právo [Prague], March 31, 1946. — K o r b e l , Pavel: Numerical 
Strength and Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Published in 
mimeographed fořm by the Free Europe Committee. New York 1954, p. 4. — K l i ­
m e š , Miloš and Z a c h o v a l , Marcel: Příspěvek k problematice únorových událostí 
v Československu v únoru 1948 [A Contribution to the Analysis of Problems 
Related to the February Events in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948]. ČsČH 6 
(1958) 191. — Rudé právo, November 20, 1948. 
As Table III shows, it took the Communists in Czechoslovakia almost 
three years, going through a complex process, to build up their power Po­
sition in the multi-party political society before they could attempt to 
seize power from their rivals3 3. T h e Communists claimed that while the 
other parties organized in 60 to 70 per cent of the communities, Commu­
nist cells blanketed 96 per cent of all local i t ies u . By the end of 1947, in 
špite of the sample polls indicating a drop in the Communist vote, the 
Communists controlled all major arteries of the power organism of the 
Czechoslovak statě. Now the Communists were ready for a Showdown with 
their opponents; they possessed at least an even chance to win the mono-
For a revealing account of how the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia was 
effected, see K r á l , op. cit.; K o z á k , op. cit.; and V e s e l ý , op. cit. 
Rudé právo, November 30, 1948. Cf. also Z i n n e r , Paul E.: Communist Stratégy 
and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918—48. New York 1963, p. 124. 
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póly of power in Czechoslovakia. They did so — and by doing so — they 
transferred the power peacefully, without violence, in February, 1948, and 
not in May, 1945. Czechoslovakia's affiliation with the Communist systém 
was effected after and not before the February coup. Hence the Kremlin ex-
planation, although not absolutely correct, is more plausible today than the 
Peking viewpoint. 
„Here as elsewhere, the fascist occupation regime with its collaborators 
was overthrown by armed action. But the national and democratic revolu-
tion developed into socialist revolution along peaceful lineš. The alliance 
of the Czechoslovak and Soviet people prevented imperialist Intervention; 
the workers' representatives took over the key posts in the government and 
the national committees, the organs of revolutionary authority; the wor-
king people established control over the nerve centers of political and eco-
nomic life; the working class was united, the Communists formed a bloc 
with the Left Social Democrats and other democratic forces; the counter-
revolutionary putsch was nipped in the bud; meetings, demonstrations and 
strikes but no destruction of production capacities — such was the generál 
pattern of the February, 1948, events. The workers, led by the Commu-
nists, carried arms but did not use them . . .35." 
This explanation of the parliamentary road to socialism in Czechoslo-
vakia is predicated on the Kremlin assertion, first introduced at the 20th 
Congress of the CPSU, that as a result of the changes in the world balance 
of forces „imperialism and reaction" have changed their nature, the law 
of class struggle has changed, and hence armed revolution as a form of 
struggle has become outmoded36. Since the essence of socialist revolution 
today is „not so much in coercion as in creating a new society"3 ' , „revo-
lution" in the Kremlin vocabulary now implies „social coercion" and not 
necessarily armed violence. 
Under conditions of peaceful coexistence, the Kremlin asserts, „favo-
rable opportunities are created for the intensification of class struggle in 
the capitalist countries, for the national liberation movement and socialist 
revolutions"38. Such „opportunities" include the nationalization of certain 
„monopolized sectors of industry", the democratization of the management 
of public sectors of the economy, the development of the initiative and 
participation of the working people in all spheres of economic life, the 
creation of democratic control over capital investments in industry and 
agriculture, the carrying out of agrarian reforms, and others. Thus, Mos-
cow maintains, „now the working class can carry out the socialist revolu-
tion by peaceful means if it wages a struggle to uphold and extend its 
democratic and social rights and gains"39 . 
35
 K a r 33. 
36
 JMJP-HC joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
37
 K a r 31. 
3S p r a vda , January 7, 1963. 
39
 K a r 36. 
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Peking, however, finds Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful coexistence the 
same as preaching class peace. The Chinese equate peaceful coexistence 
and the peaceful road to socialism with heresy committed by revisionism40. 
The Chinese Communist leaders admit that historical conditions have chan-
ged fundamentally since the end of World War II41 , however, they categori-
cally deny the Kremlin allegation that „imperialism and reaction" have 
changed their nature: 
„Abundant historical evidence indicates the reactionary classes never give 
up power voluntarily . . . They are always the first to use violence to 
repress the revolutionary mass movement, and to provoke civil war, thus 
placing armed struggle on the agenda42." 
As much as the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC] believe 
that the chief component of the „bourgeois State machine" is armed force 
and not parliament, to them the acquisition of a stable majority in par-
liament by the Proletariat through elections is either impossible or unde-
pendable. They consider it impossible because roughly onehalf of the Com-
munist parties in the capitalist countries are still illegal and undependable 
because the bourgeoisie can always change the electoral laws of the 
country. Thus, in Mao Tse-tung's own words, 
„The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, 
is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist 
principle holds good universally, for China and for all other countries . . . 
We may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed43." 
Hence the Chinese Communists exalt their own concept of armed revolu-
tion and repudiate the Kremlin concept of peaceful transition. 
Concluding observations 
Ten years ago, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Communist theory 
of socialist revolution was reexamined in the light of certain fundamental 
changes that had taken place in the world since the Second World War. As 
a result, revolution was termed synonymous with social coercion rather 
than armed violence. 
40
 For the complete text of the Chinese criticism, see „The Proletarian Revolution 
and Khrushchev's Revisionism." JMJP-HC Joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
41
 „The change is mainly manifested in the great increase in the forces of 
imperialism. Since the war, the mighty socialist camp and a whole series of new 
and independent nationalist states have emerged, and there have occurred a con-
tinuous succession of armed revolutionary struggles, a new upsurge in the mass 
movements in capitalist countries and the great expansion of the ranks of the 
international Communist movement, the international proletarian socialist re-
volutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America have become the two 
major historical trends of our time." JMJP-HC Joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
42
 I b i d . 
43
 Problems of War and Stratégy. Selected Military Writings. Peking 1963, pp. 267 
and 273. Quoted in JMJP-HC Joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
25 
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Moscow's optimal belief in peaceful socialist revolution — challenged by 
Peking — is based on the premise that under conditions of peaceful co-
existence favorable opportunities are created for the intensification of class 
struggle in the capitalist countries, for the national liberation movement and 
socialist revolutions in the underdeveloped areas. The Kremlin leaders cite 
Czechoslovakia as a case in point. „Here as elsewhere, the fascist occupa-
tion regime with its collaborators was overthrown by armed action. But 
the national and democratic revolution developed into socialist revolution 
along peaceful lines44." Peking, on the other hand, considers the achieve-
ment of the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia as a non-peaceful de-
velopment during the final stage of World War IL „From China to Cuba", 
Peking proclaims, „all [Communist] revolutions, without exception, were 
won by armed struggle and by fighting against armed Imperialist aggres-
sion and Intervention45." Peking insists that there is no historical precedent 
for peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism and hence regards the 
use of violence a prerequisite to proletarian revolution. 
How accurate is the Chinese contention? Is there an historical precedent 
for a Communist party seizing power peacefully? Who has a better chance 
of convincing the members of the world Communist movement about the 
validity of the two types of socialist revolution, Peking or the Kremlin? 
What should be the role of the non-Communist countries, and, of course, 
the Czechoslovak exile, in this controversy? 
Unfortunately, on the basis of gross figures, Peking's argument for non-
peaceful methods of socialist revolutions is historically justified. As Table 
I shows, eighty-four per cent of all socialist revolutions were non-peaceful 
and only sixteen per cent were peaceful. Seventy-eight and one-half per 
cent of all successful revolutions were non-peaceful and only twenty-one 
and one-half per cent were peaceful. However, if we disregard the old 
cliche that history repeats itself and take into consideration the present 
danger involving annihilation of mankind, then the Chinese claim obviously 
cannot be considered justified. Furthermore, if we accept the premise that 
it was predominantly the Western challenge manifested by the arms race, 
the ability to cope with chronic tension during the ice period of the so-
called Cold War, the nuclear stalemate and the capability to overkill that 
compelled the Soviet Union to seek competitive peaceful coexistence, which 
in turn made war and violent revolution as methods of continuation' of 
foreign policy obsolete, then we must also admit that the success or failure 
of the Chinese advocacy with respect to their own concept of revolution 
will greatly depend on whether or not the non-Communist countries will 
permit Mao Tse-tung to prove his theory in practice. Should the Chinese 
Communist leader be successful in his endeavor, we can be certain that all 
gains toward peace would suddenly be jeopardized by the blind ambition 
14
 Ka r 33. 
45
 JMJP-HC Joint editorial, March 31, 1964. 
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and excessive optimism of the Communist warmongcrs. It must be, there-
fore, the duty of all peace-loving nations of the world to circumvent the 
Chinese militant philosophy of revolution from becoming a practical tool 
of international politics. I t must be doně by all nations using every avail-
able means — including that of the Quai ďOrsay (aspiring to resolve the 
issue by using political power rather than military force). As the most 
powerful non-Communist country in the world, the United States must let 
Peking know that any Communist Chinese sponsored revolution or military 
adventure anywhere in the world would necessitate multilateral action 
against her. Perhaps Communist China will one day realize — as did Com­
munist Russia — that any change by force is futile especially when it in-
corporates the possibility of self-destruction. If, however, the Soviet Union 
should continue to promise military aid to Communist China, in case of 
war, it is doubtful that Peking will soon change its bellicose attitude to-
ward the United States and her allies. One might even venture to argue 
that the present-day polarized Communist systém is, military speaking, as 
strong as ever because it is able to accommodate extremists of the left 
and the right as well as those in the center of the spectrum without ac-
tually sacrificing its security arrangement. Thus, while the Sino-Soviet 
dispute leads to internal diversification of the Communist systém, the 
unity of its security remains unfettered. 
T h e Sino-Soviet controversy over the concept of socialist revolution must 
not go unchallenged by the Czechoslovak exile. It should induce a. reexami-
nation and a response. I t is bigh time for the world engaged in the struggle 
between darkness and light to learn about the truth concerning the events 
of February, 1948. No apologia or rationalizations of any kind can help 
prevent repetition of the pincer technique, skillfully ušed by Communists, 
in Asia, Africa, Latin America or Europe. Just as the Communists were 
able to learn from their own past mistakes — i. e., the unsuccessful Com­
munist revolutions — so must democracies learn from their weaknesses 
committed in the past vis-a-vis totalitarianism. T h e argument that the Com­
munist coup ďetat in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, was successful be­
cause of „the display of Soviet power" has very little validity today, espe­
cially when the question is raised: Was not the display of Soviet power in 
Czechoslovakia strongest from May to December, 1945; less strong in 1946 and 
gradually weaker in 1947 and 1948? Had the Czechoslovak Communists conside-
red „Soviet power" to be the key to a successful socialist revolution, in all pro-
babilities the Prague coup would have been carried out before December, 
1945 — before the Soviet army withdrew from Czechoslovakia. T h e fact 
remains that unlike in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Bulgaria and 
other countries where the Communist parties were outlawed shortly after 
World War I, in Czechoslovakia the Communist party had a long tradition 
— interrupted only during World War I I — and a favorable position in the 
multi-party systém of the first republic. It numbered as second largest party 
in the generál elections, held in 1925, and third in the generál elections of 
25* 
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1929 and 1935. Hence the strength of the Communist party of Czechoslova­
kia was built rapidly and effectively after the Second World War. Yet, it 
took the Communists almost three years, and the use of all available demo­
cratic and undemocratic means, to capture the monopoly of power in 
Czechoslovakia. 
This reporter's aim is not to judge but to examine, not to condemn but 
to correct. Much is to be learned yet from the mistakes committed by the 
leaders of the democratic forces of the post-World War T w o Czechoslovak 
republik. T h e plea, therefore, is addressed to those who can bring light to 
darkness so that truth shall prevail even if the cost is self-criticism and 
loss of pride. Let us prove to the world that we are worthy pupils of our 
latě teacher, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. 
D E R T S C H E C H O S L O W A K I S C H E K O M M U N I S T I S C H E 
S T A A T S S T R E I C H U N D D A S 
C H I N E S I S C H - S O W J E T I S C H E S T R E I T G E S P R Ä C H 
Von Peter A. Toma 
Die Historiker sprechen von unserer Zeit als von einer Zeit ungeheurer 
sozialer und politischer Umwälzungen, wobei auf der einen Seite Wissen­
schaft und Technik den Modernisierungsprozeß repräsentieren, auf der an­
deren Seite Demokratie und Kommunismus. 
In der kommunistischen Terminologie ist die Modernisierung ein wirt­
schaftlicher Prozeß, bei dem die sozialistische Revolution, die eine neue 
Gesellschaftsform, nämlich den Kommunismus, hervorzubringen hat, eine 
bedeutende Rolle spielt. Heute betonen die russischen Kommunisten aus­
drücklich die Nützlichkeit friedlicher sozialistischer Revolutionen, indem 
sie sich auf den tschechoslowakischen Staatsstreich vom Februar 1948 be­
rufen, Revolution leugnen und daran festhalten, daß es in der Geschichte 
kein Beispiel für den friedlichen Übergang vom Kapitalismus zum Kommu­
nismus gibt. 
Vorliegender Beitrag hat sich ein dreifaches Ziel gesteckt: 1. alle sozia­
listischen Revolutionen von 1917—1962 aufzuzählen; 2. nochmals die Me­
thoden zu prüfen, mit denen das kommunistische Machtmonopol in der 
Tschechoslowakei hergestellt wurde und 3. den Einfluß des Februar-Staats­
streichs auf das heutige kommunistische revolutionäre Denken zu bestim­
men. 
Die kommunistische Machtergreifung kann friedlich oder nicht-friedlich 
vor sich gehen. Die Formen der friedlichen Revolution sind: Staatsstreich, 
Volksentscheid und Wahlen; die Formen der nicht-friedlichen Revolution 
sind: Guerrilla- oder Bürgerkrieg, bewaffneter Aufstand und militärische 
Intervention. 
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Seit 1917 gab es in der Welt 38 sozialistische Revolutionen. Von den 14 
erfolgreichen gingen drei friedlich vor sich, nämlich in der Tschechoslowa-
kei und in Cuba (Staatsstreich) sowie in der Äußeren Mongolei (Volksent-
scheid). Unter den 24 erfolglosen sozialistischen Revolutionen waren ebenso 
drei friedliche Versuche. In der Geschichte der sozialistischen Revolutionen 
liefen in vielen Fällen mehrere Formen des Kampfes nebeneinander her, am 
häufigsten wurde die kommunistische Expansion durch militärische Erobe-
rung und Okkupation bewirkt. 
Von den sieben Revolutionsversuchen zwischen 1917 und 1920 hatte nur 
einer Erfolg, und zwar in Rußland. In den Jahren von 1929—1933, in denen 
Streiks, Beschäftigungslösigkeit und Demonstrationen häufiger waren als zu 
irgendeiner anderen Zeit der kommunistischen Geschichte, gab es nirgends 
Revolutionsversuche und die Kommunistische Partei verlor sogar in vielen 
Ländern Mitglieder. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1945—1950, gab es 16 
Revolutionsversuche, von denen 12 Erfolg hatten. Davon erlangte der 
tschechoslowakische Staatsstreich (1948) größere Bedeutung als irgendeine 
andere sozialistische Revolution nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Er war der 
Anfang einer neuen Revolutionsära in der Geschichte der sozialistischen 
Revolution. 
Die Sozialistische Revolution in der Tschechoslovakei, wie sie die tsche-
choslowakischen Historiker heute sehen, begann am 27. Mai 1946, einen 
T a g nach den ersten parlamentarischen Nachkriegswahlen, und endete am 
27. Juni 1948, dem Tag, als die Tschechoslowakische Sozialdemokratische 
Partei von der Kommunistischen Partei der Tschechoslowakei aufgesaugt 
wurde. Vom April 1945 bis zum 27. Mai 1946 waren die Kommunisten in 
der Tschechoslowakei mit einer nationalen und demokratischen Revolution 
beschäftigt. Die erste Aufgabe dieser Periode war die Bildung einer kommu-
nistischen Stärke in der Nation. Nach dieser Methode wird Zuerst durch 
Agitation ein Druck von unten her erzeugt, der dann, verbunden mit dem 
Druck von oben, durch gesetzgebende Initiative, die Opposition in eine 
ständige Verteidigung drängt. Der Zweck dieses Schemas ist, die Gegner 
zu zwingen, dem Druck von beiden Seiten nachzugeben, und sie schließ-
lich in die für den letzten Schlag wünschenswerte Lage hineinzumanöv-
rieren. Die Hauptstützen der kommunistischen Stärke während der sozia-
listischen Revolution waren: 1. die Fähigkeit, die Arbeiterbewegung auszu-
nützen; 2. die Monopolstellung in der Landwirtschaftspolitik; 3. das Ge-
schick, die Sozialdemokratische Partei in eine Organisation umzuwandeln, 
die den kommunistischen Interessen diente. Von den 26 Mitgliedern der 
Gottwald-Regierung traten zwölf nicht-kommunistische Parteiführer auf 
ständigen Druck von Seiten der Kommunisten am 20. Februar 1948 zurück 
und verursachten somit eine kommunistisch forcierte Regierungskrise. 
Beneš, der Präsident der Republik, hatte, ebenfalls unter Druck, die Rück-
trittserklärungen entgegenzunehmen und neue Minister (natürlich Kommu-
nisten) zu ernennen. Am 25. Februar 1948 war der Übergang von der alten 
zur neuen Regierung unter dem Anschein der Legalität vollzogen. Der 
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Zeitraum zwischen dem Staatsstreich im Februar und der Gleichschaltung 
im Juni wurde von den Kommunisten gut genützt, um ihre Position zu 
stärken. Am 28. Mai hielten sie wieder Wahlen ab mit einer einzigen 
Kandidatenliste, wodurch ihre im Februar erlangte Macht legitimiert wurde. 
Nun war der Weg frei für die endgültige Errichtung des kommunistischen 
Machtmonopols. Am 7. Juni trat Eduard Beneš noch formell von seinem 
Präsidentenposten zurück und am 27. Juni 1848 erfreute sich die kommu-
nistische Partei des Zusammenschlusses mit dem geläuterten Rest der So-
zialdemokratischen Partei. Nach Klement Gottwald, dem Nachfolger Benešs 
auf dem Präsidentenstuhl, war der 27. Juni in der Geschichte der tschecho-
slowakischen Arbeiterklasse ebenso bedeutend wie der Mai 1945 und der 
Februar 1948. Ohne die Hilfe der Sozialdemokraten wäre der kommuni-
stische Druck „von oben" ein Fiasko und die „friedliche" Machtergreifung 
im Februar 1948 unerreichbar gewesen. 
Im Gegensatz zu den Prager Kommunisten ist Peking der Meinung, daß 
das kommunistische Machtmonopol in der Tschechoslowakei der Bourgeoisie 
während des Zweiten Weltkrieges auf nicht-friedlichem Wege entrissen und 
nicht von Mai 1946 bis Juni 1948 friedlich erlangt wurde; das heißt: Peking 
möchte glaubhaft machen, daß die sozialistische Revolution in der Tsche-
choslowakei August 1944 (mit dem kommunistisch-geführten slowakischen 
Nationalaufstand) begann und Mai 1945 (mit dem kommunistisch-gelenkten 
Prager Aufstand und der Errichtung der provisorischen Regierung) endete. 
Von da an wäre die Macht in den Händen der tschechischen Kommunisten 
gewesen, die im Februar 1948 nur fortfuhren, ihre Macht zu behaupten. 
Für Kenner der Verhältnisse ist diese chinesische Interpretation reine Phan-
tasie. Die kommunistische Macht in der Tschechoslowakei war nämlich von 
August 1944 bis Mai 1945 am schwächsten und wurde dann bis 1948 
schrittweise stärker, was eine Tabelle veranschaulicht. 
So ist die Erklärung, die der Kreml auf dem 20. Parteitag der KPDSU 
abgab, und die mit der Auffassung der tschechischen Historiker überein-
stimmt, zwar auch nicht korrekt, aber um vieles glaubhafter als die chine-
sische Ansicht. Auch ist der Kreml der Meinung, daß in der heute verän-
derten Welt das Wesentliche der sozialistischen Revolution nicht mehr so 
sehr die Gewaltanwendung als vielmehr die Schaffung einer neuen Gesell-
schaft sei. Unter den Bedingungen einer friedlichen Koexistenz, behauptet 
der Kreml, würden günstige Gelegenheiten für die Intensivierung des. Klas-
senkampfes in den kapitalistischen Ländern geschaffen. 
Für die Chinesen jedoch ist friedliche Koexistenz und friedlicher Weg 
zum Sozialismus Häresie, für sie gibt es nur bewaffnete Revolution und sie 
weisen die Auffassung des Kreml vom friedlichen Übergang zurück. Leider 
sind Pekings Argumente für die nicht-friedliche Methode der sozialistischen 
Revolution historisch gerechtfertigt. Es ist darum Pflicht aller friedlieben-
den Nationen, Peking mit allen Mitteln daran zu hindern, seine militante 
Philosophie in die Tat umzusetzen. 
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